Conference Governance

The illusion of choice confronts conferences over compliance and governance insecurity.

Conferences are being forced to govern themselves despite being structurally incapable, or unwilling, to do so effectively.

The NCAA has begged, pleaded, borrowed, and stolen in an attempt to receive an antitrust exemption.

And, unsurprisingly, they have failed.

The antitrust issue is too sticky, in too many different ways, for lawmakers representing a broad array of constituents.

And the lawmakers did what they do best: they took money from anyone willing to ask for favors (the NCAA and Power 4 conferences), which then allowed them to take credit for trying to solve a problem many people want solved (like immigration, drunk driving, gun laws, etc.), only to make effectively no progress on the issue.

The antitrust exemption is the only way the NCAA can continue to exist while manipulating the terms under which athletes participate as underpaid laborers in college athletics.

Without that exemption, the lawlessness of the current system will continue, and the patchwork solution of CSC oversight combined with limited NCAA authority will only partially curtail member institutions’ “cheating” and general disregard for the rules.

So the Power 4 conferences have begun exploring self-governance.

And in doing so, the conferences have been forced to borrow a page from the athletic director playbook: attempting to solve problems using a set of skills developed through largely irrelevant experience.

In the same way athletic directors were not previously tasked with maximizing revenue generation or allocating revenue directly to athletes, conferences surely are not well-equipped to make rules and decisions strictly for the governance of their own member institutions—particularly while simultaneously competing against other Power 4 schools.

Indeed, conferences already govern their own members, but not in ways that require them to create rules that might impose a significant competitive disadvantage against rival conferences.

Remember, conferences are often bitter foes, and many of the schools new to their conferences are still only fractional earners.

Should Washington be able to vote equally in determining the future of the Big Ten alongside Michigan?

Would revenue-sharing maximums be welcomed equally by Rutgers, Maryland, and Michigan?

Would conferences be willing to assume the liability associated with permitting potential Title IX violations or international student visa complications?

How long would the Power 4 conferences agree to be governed by the same rules when conference revenues are stratified in $200–$300 million television rights increments?

Some of these problems can be solved, but the current landscape of college athletics has proven to be a delicate balance of levers and pulleys, where one approval or denial can trigger a domino effect resulting in both foreseeable and unforeseeable challenges.

There is acknowledgment from conference leadership that the CSC solution has, unsurprisingly, been imperfect.

But it has steadied the ship by creating a perceived level playing field, and there is at least a standard everyone is supposedly expected to follow—a massive improvement over the unregulated frontloading that took place this time last year.

Hope has been the plan all along for most Power 4 schools.

They have put themselves in impossible predicaments—burning through donor loyalty and goodwill, breaking one or more rules, or simply kicking the can down the road in hopes of eventually solving looming problems.

This problem is not merely a proverbial broken bone that simply needs time to heal.

It is a fast-growing tumor that, if not addressed soon (though exactly how soon remains unclear), could create significantly more serious problems in the future.

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Any changes to the House Settlement as it currently stands must be unanimously approved by the Power 4 conferences and the Pac-12.

With the Big 12 and ACC recently stating their opposition to changes or modifications (such as a raised spending cap), meaningful adjustments do not appear imminent.

As it stands now, according to Ross Dellinger and CSC, $115 million in deals has been approved since January, while $125 million has either been rejected or remains under review.

Georgia’s president has called the House Settlement “a disaster.”

The CSC denied $7.5 million in deals to 18 Nebraska football players.

That’s a lot of money.

More than 24 schools are thought to have football rosters costing $30+ million (while this year’s cap is $21.3 million).

Another dozen or more schools are believed to have $20 million basketball rosters.

So I might ask: who exactly has the House Settlement been a disaster for? And how do you define disaster?

Players beginning to earn closer to their market value is a disaster?

Building viewership, expanding postseason tournaments, growing multimedia rights distributions, increasing merchandise sales, strengthening donor contributions, improving facilities, and securing naming-rights fees doesn’t feel like a disaster.

Leadership, governance, and compliance? A disaster? Sure.

But categorically a disaster? Nah.

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SEC (Destin, Florida) and Big Ten (Rancho Palos Verdes, California) conference meetings are taking place in expensive, dreamier vacation destinations.

Be clear: the primary aim of people in power is to ensure the gravy train keeps rolling.

Creating something entirely new—something that introduces more risk, more liability, and more insecurity for conference leadership—is surely less of a priority than many are suggesting.

It feels similar to the seven-year lobbying effort aimed at convincing politicians to “help” with college athletics reform and antitrust relief.

You see the same mentality among many athletic directors, who increasingly seem focused on positioning themselves for a cushy golden-parachute ending to their tenure as athletic department leaders.

Here’s to a plan of easier work for equal, or greater, pay.